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Roger G. Noll* and Lewis A. Rivlin**
In a recent article in this Journal,' Baumol and Walton review the
debate over the proper theoretical approach to setting prices for serv-
ices of regulated monopolies that offer some competitive services. Their
article makes two principal points: (1) Incremental cost,2 rather than
fully distributed cost3 should be used to set minimum prices in com-
petitive markets because it results in lower prices to consumers; and
(2) federal regulatory agencies are adopting this standard.
Neither of these conclusions is necessarily true. Since a regulated
firm is allowed to earn the same rate of return on the same total invest-
ment, adopting incremental cost methods may lower prices in a com-
petitive market and increase prices in a monopoly market. In addition,
prices eventually will be higher if the price-setting method creates in-
centives for regulated firms to adopt higher cost technologies, causes
the costs of dealing with regulators to increase substantially, or insulates
the regulated firm from having to pay for inefficient practices through
loss of markets.
A regulator faces several formidable practical problems in imple-
menting an incremental cost method for setting prices in indtostries in
which some of the competitors operate simultaneously in other regu-
lated monopoly markets. A regulated monopolist can use an incre-
mental cost standard to foreclose competition that is economically de-
sirable. If this occurs, prices for the monopoly service, the monopolist's
costs, and ultimately prices for the potentially competitive service will
be higher than if competition had not been prevented. Aware of such
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1. Baumol & Walton, Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice, 82 YALE
L.J. 639 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Baumol & Walton].
2. Incremental cost is the additional cost to the firm of supplying a particular service.
It excludes costs directly attributable to the production of other services and certain
unattributable costs which are incurred in common for all services supplied by the
firm and do not vary with the level of output.
Baumol & Walton 639 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
3. Fully distributed cost combines the additional cost to the firm of supplying a
particular service with some proportion of the unattributable costs.
Id.
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potential hazards of incremental cost pricing, regulators generally have
been reluctant to adopt this approach.
I. Incremental Cost Methods and Predatory Pricing
There is ample support for the proposition that predatory pricing
in any industry, particularly by a regulated monopolist in a competi-
tive market, is undesirable. 4 Unfortunately, an incremental cost method
of setting regulated prices invites predatory pricing.
In a competitive, unregulated market, firms, reluctant to incur a loss,
normally will not sell a service at a price that falls below incremental
cost. Such pricing usually occurs only as a short-term marketing strat-
egy, either to drive a weaker competitor out of business, thereby creat-
ing or protecting a monopoly, or as a form of advertising to establish
a market position. 5 In both instances, the entire price structure must
eventually generate revenues higher than incremental costs, or the
strengthened market position will not be worth the costs incurred to
achieve it.
In a regulated industry, a firm may benefit by a long-term strategy
of pricing a service below its incremental cost. Permissible profits are
based on some fixed fraction of either total costs or the costs of the
capital investment. Thus, if a regulated firm loses part of its market
to a competitor, its costs will decline and it will be permitted to earn
less profit. If it operates in two markets, one competitive and one
monopolistic, then it may earn more profit if it continues a below-cost
operation in its competitive market and makes up the loss by raising
prices and reducing sales in its monopoly market.0
4. In Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
the court said:
Pricing below cost is a severely anti-competitive tactic frequently engaged in b
corporations with significant resources to drive weaker competitors from the field.
While the consumer may be the immediate beneficiary of thc price struggle, if the
tactic succeeds he will eventually be subject to the economic strength and therefore
the discretionary pricing of the survivor. In the meantime, competitors will be driven
out, not by the superior efficiency of the larger entity, but rather by the greater
resources which enable it to sustain temporary losses for a longer time.
See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969); Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co. v. F.T.C., 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966); National Dairy Prods. Corp. %. United
States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir.), remanded on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1963); Atlas
Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 US. 843 (1960); Maryland Baking Co. v. F.T.C., 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E. B.
Muller & Co. v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto Rican American Tobacco Co.
v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
5. For example, to establish such a position a grocery chain might reduce prices
on a few "loss leaders."
6. See Averch & Johnson, The Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint, 52
Am. Ecox. REv. 1053 (1962). Employing conventional microeconomic theory, the authors
predict that regulated firms whose profits on fixed investments are limited to a "fair
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If it has diseconomies of scale, the regulated firm will have added
incentive to price below incremental cost. Without regulation, a firm
will increase output only to the point where the last unit of output
generates a large enough increase in revenues to cover its incremental
cost. If a regulated firm faces diseconomies of scale, this practice will
normally produce greater profits than the firm is allowed to earn.1 The
firm will be able to retain some of this additional profit only by in-
creasing production beyond the point where incremental cost equals
price.
Under a system of incremental cost pricing, the greater the fraction
of total costs that can be put into a pot of "unallocated" costs, not in-
cluded in the incremental costs of any service, the greater is the ability
of the firm to alter prices to maximize its own profit. This increases
the firm's ability to subvert the purpose of regulation by undercutting
its competitive rivals and inching up prices in its monopoly market to
the level that would prevail without regulation.
II. Detectiag Incorrect Estimates of Incremental Cost
Because a regulated firm may find it profitable to underestimate in-
cremental costs, adoption of an incremental cost standard for prices
creates an enforcement problem for the regulatory agency. Detecting
incorrect or improper estimates of incremental costs is difficult for
several reasons:
A. Defining Services
The incremental cost of a particular service depends upon the con-
cepts used to define services. Although they may have largely over-
lapping technical characteristics and costs, distinctions among services
rate of return" will tend to use more capital than is economically efficient. In their
initial theoretical treatment, Averch and Johnson dealt primarily with tie tendency of
regulated firms to substitute capital for labor. Extending their model for a two.service
firm, realistic assumptions about production technology and demand would predict that
the regulated firm will also produce too much output and charge too low a price in
the competitive market.
7. Assume that a firm experiences diseconomies of scale for its total output of all
services. This means that the incremental cost of each service grows higher as total
service increases; the sum of the incremental costs exceeds the total costs of the firm.
Prices intended to recover incremental costs, including the profit allowed by regulators,
would generate revenue that exceeded the total costs the firm is allowed to recover.
Therefore, the firm has a strong incentive to increase its costs to capture greater revenues
and profits. Unless the firm incurs unproductive costs, the only available mechanism
for capturing additional potential profits is to reduce prices and increase output and
costs. This, however, results in a situation in which prices are lower than that required
to recover incremental cost, and sales are expanded in the face of scale diseconomies
that could be avoided through competition.
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often are made to accommodate different groups of users. For example,
suppose a broad class of services C includes Service X and Service Y,
and that an important component of the cost of X and Y is a joint cost
E. If either X or Y is produced, some expenditure of E must be made,
but producing either X or Y, once the other is produced, creates no
increase in E.8 If the firm decides to treat X and Y as distinct services,
then the incremental costs of neither X nor Y will include E. But, if
the firm decides to treat the broad class C as the "service," its incre-
mental cost will include E. Obviously, if a regulated firm faces com-
petition in marketing X and Y, it will be able to compete more effec-
tively if it adopts the more narrow definition of services so that neither
service will be required to recover E.9
In theory, the regulatory agency could respond to this problem by
performing several incremental cost analyses. It could then require
that each service and the members of a class of services earn at least
their incremental cost. This would require highly detailed knowledge
of the technology and economics of the regulated firm, and the quan-
tity, quality, and continuity of personnel to carry out numerous sophis-
ticated estimates of incremental costs. This kind of information and
capacity for analysis is not usually present in the regulatory agencies
or the regulated firms.' 0
B. The Choice of Technology
Any mechanism for regulating prices creates incentives for a regu-
lated firm to base its technical decisions on factors other than economic
efficiency."' An incremental cost standard creates an incentive to adopt
8. For example, a class of railroad services could be the totality of ser'ices offered
between a pair of cities. The components of that class would be the several types of
freight shipments available. E would then cover the basic costs of offering any service,
such as terminals and tracking.
9. In the railroad example, supra note 8, the first method would result in a floor
on the price of each type of shipment that was based on the incremental cost of of-
fering a new service. The second method would require that prices be set so that the
total revenues earned between the two cities equaled the incremental cost of offering
the services between them, as compared to abandoning the route.
10. In another context, Dr. Baumol has argued that firms are unlikely to exhibit
the overcapitalization predicted by Averch and Johnson, supra note 6, because "firms
have neither the extensive information nor the refined decision process necessary to
lead unerringly to the A-J [Averch-JohnsonJ input distortions." Baumol & Klevorick,
Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Ovewiew of the Discussion, 1 BELt.
JoURNAL 189 (1970). Yet precisely the same kind of extensive, detailed information on
production and cost functions is required to calculate incremental costs. If incremental
cost methods force firms to develop this infornation, the tendency to A.-J overcapitali-
zation will increase. Unless regulators have it available, prices will bear no meaningful
relation to true unestimated incremental cost.
11. For a detailed treatment of the general problem of suboptimnal teclmical choices
by regulated firms, see TEcHNoLomc.r. CtANGE iN REGULATED LNDusnrsS (W. Capron
ed. 1971). Among the examples discussed is the intriguing case of "piggyback" railcars.
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technologies that make unattributable costs as high a fraction of total
costs as possible. If more costs are unattributable, the regulated firm
obtains a great advantage since the incremental cost floor on its prices
in the competitive market will be lower. Thus, in choosing among
alternative technologies, the incentive of the firm is shifted from mini-
mizing total costs to reducing the costs that can clearly be attributed to
the competitive service, even if this results in higher total costs.
Again, theoretically, a regulatory agency could be so knowledgeable
about the technical alternatives available to the regulated firms, in-
cluding those specifically uninvestigated, that inefficient technical
choices could be prevented. Such prescience on the part of the regu-
lator is unlikely, particularly in an industry in which nearly all of the
research and development is done by the regulated firms. Promising
technical possibilities that threaten the "natural monopoly" of the
firms may surreptitiously be suppressed.
C. True Costs of Materials
If incremental cost is to be meaningful, the prices paid by the regu-
lated firm for the resources used to produce a service must reflect their
true economic costs. If the regulated firm owns its principal suppliers,
or if one supplier is the sole provider of some materials for both com-
petitive and monopoly services, there is almost no way to insure that
the regulated firm will not shift much of the true cost of the materials
used in its competitive services to its monopoly services.1 2 To protect
against this, the regulatory agency would need to become familiar with
the technology and cost structure of the original suppliers.,la
II. Incremental Costs and the New Competitor
When an efficient new entrant seeks to compete with a regulated
firm, society may benefit if the established firm lowers its price in
Price regulation based on historical costs forced the railroads to adopt extra-long flat
cars for carrying loaded trucks. These cars were expensive to build and necessitated
regrading of some roadbeds and recutting some tunnels not designed for such long cars.
Consequently the innovation of truck-rail piggyback service was much more expensive
than it could have been. See Gellman, Surface Freight Transportation, in TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 166.
12. A different form of the problem of a vertically integrated firm arose in the
early history of the airline industry. Carriers, often owned by aircraft manufacturers,
purchased inferior or high-cost airplanes from their sister enterprises. As a condition
of regulation and subsidization of the industry, the federal government forced dis.
solution of the vertically integrated firms. See A. PHILLIPS, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET
STRUCTURE 74-77, 93 (1971).
13. In the case of telecommunications, as an example, the FCC would need to be
satisfied that Western Electric did not underprice microwave equipment used for com-
petitive private line service and overprice telephone instruments used primarily In
monopoly telephone services.
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response to the competition, and continues to provide service while
its short-run incremental costs fall below the long-run incremental costs
of the competitor.14 In a competitive market, the price charged by
the established firms tends to produce revenues equal to long-run in-
cremental costs. If a competitor invents a new technology with lower
long-run incremental costs, prices will tend to fall until revenues for
all firms are consistent with the new technology's long-run incre-
mental costs. Firms using the old technology will continue to operate
with old facilities as long as the new price permits them to cover their
short-run incremental costs, but eventually, as their capital facilities
wear out, they will be forced either to adopt the new technology or to
leave the industry. Applying this description to a regulated market,
the regulatory rules that most closely parallel competitive behavior are
as follows: (1) allow the price to be determined by the long-run incre-
mental costs of the new, efficient producer; (2) allow the higher cost
producers to continue to offer service with facilities that would other-
wise lie idle or that have less valuable alternative uses at a profit-maxi-
mizing price approaching that of the new competitor as long as they
can cover their true short-run incremental costs; and (3) prohibit the
higher cost producers from constructing new facilities unless the true
long-run incremental costs of the new facilities are at least as low as
those of the lowest cost producers.
In practice, those rules are difficult to implement because of the
socially undesirable incentives they create for the regulated firm. If the
established firm perceives that incremental cost will be the basis for
pricing decisions by the regulatory agency, it may choose technologies
that appear to minimize short-run incremental costs. For example, by
substituting capital equipment for labor, more of the service is ac-
counted for by capital investments that generate little or no short-run
costs. The established firm could thereby maintain high sales and low
profits in the competitive market, and, unless forbidden by the regu-
latory agency, could cover some of the long-run incremental costs of
the competitive service by increasing prices in its monopoly markets.
The recent Otter Tail decision 0 proscribed under § 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act1 a number of actions to prevent municipal power
14. For the established firm, the difference between short-run and long-run incre-
mental costs is the annualized fixed cost of the senice. In the short-run the firm's
capital investments are fixed; over time the amount of capital invested is %ariable, as
are expenditures on all other productive resources. To calculate long.run costs, one
assumes that no capital facilities have been built or other fixed resource commitments
made, and that one is free to choose whatever technologies and combination of re-
sources will produce lowest costs.
15. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1022 (1973).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
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companies from entering the market to serve their own communities.
The effect of this decision would be subverted if the private electric
utility were permitted by a regulatory authority to adopt a pricing
scheme allowing it to destroy municipal power competition by selec-
tively lowering its offered rates in areas where its licenses were up for
renewal, and the communities wished to offer municipal service. This
scheme would enable the power company to establish substantially
lower rates, since the incremental costs of continuing service in areas
previously served would be substantially lower than the incremental
costs of initiating service to a particular locality.
In regulated industries "competition" is often over the right to a
monopoly-two firms may bid for the right to be the sole supplier of a
service. The new firm would always be excluded by application of a
rule which allowed the established firm to continue to be the sole pro-
ducer as long as its short-run incremental costs were lower. Only a
small part of the established firm's fixed capital investments mature at
a given time, so that it will always have substantial fixed costs that are
excluded from the short-run cost calculation. Consequently, the estab-
lished firm is not pressured by competition from the new firm to adopt
lower cost methods. Therefore, although initially resulting in lower
prices, this rule would not result in production at lowest cost.
IV. Current Agency Practice
Baumol and Walton imply that the regulatory agencies are on the
verge of adopting an incremental cost standard as the sole means of de-
termining rates for regulated services.' 7 The agencies, however, have
been cautious in applying incremental cost.18
Baumol and Walton also imply that the use of incremental cost
standards represents a repudiation of a fully allocated cost standard. 10
In fact, regulators rarely relate prices of individual services to any
17. Baumol & Walton 644, 647, 655.
18. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission General Order 29, 37 FED. RE(. 25717 (1972).
The Federal Maritime Commission specifically required that fully distributed cost methods
be used by carriers transporting military cargo. Unallocatcd common costs were to be
handled as follows: "[W]here a carrier . . . operates a facility which is used jointly
with another service, expense considered common to both areas shall be allocated to the
military service on the basis which accurately reflects the relative use each service makes
of the common facility." Id. at 25719. See also American Lines v. Louisville & N.R.
Co., 392 U.S. 571 (1968); Los Angeles v. Federal Maritime Commission, 385 F.2d 678,
682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Members of Congress have introduced bills to authorize private predatory pricing
suits under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). See S. 780, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and H.R. 2384, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) which would require
that costs for such purposes be defined as "fully distributed costs."
19. Baumol & Walton 639, 644, 655.
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measure of costs. The issue before an agency usually is not which cost
method to adopt, but whether the agency should continue to favor a
price structure in which the rates for some services are below any meas-
ure of costs. 20 For example, the CAB pursued a "cross-subsidy" policy,
setting prices below costs on certain low-density air routes and making
up the losses by monopoly pricing on more lucrative routes, in order
to maximize the number of cities provided with air service.-" Since
most of the low-density routes are monopolies, and most of the profit-
able routes are to some degree competitive, the issue at the CAB was
whether to raise prices on monopoly routes to at least incremental cost
levels. The CAB eventually abandoned cross-subsidization and adopted
cost-related pricing because the firms simply eroded away monopoly
profits by engaging in nonprice competition on their profitable routes.
Similarly, the debate over route abandonments at the ICC has
focused on whether a firm should be forced to continue serving a
monopoly route when its revenues are not adequate to cover incre-
mental costs. The ICC's basic policy on rates for individual commodi-
ties has been to maintain rate differentials between low-value bulk
commodities and high-value manufactured commodities through value-
of-service pricing.22 The specific issue is whether to move in the direc-
tion of cost-based rates-any method of cost-based rates-rather than
engage in the continued subsidization of bulk commodity shipments
by other types of shipments.2-3
V. Recommended Agency Direction
By revising their policies on allowable costs, the agencies could re-
move some of a firm's incentive to provide uneconomic service in com-
petitive markets. One necessary step is to prevent the use of higher
prices in the monopoly markets to recapture the difference between
20. For a more complete discussion of the attitude of regulatory agencies towards
prices and new technology, see R. NoLL, REFrOImhNo REcLTtoIN: A%, EVAI.,ToN OF
THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS 15-32 (1971).
21. See G. EADs, THE Loc4L SERVIcE AIRLINE "x'PE.RI.sENXT (1972).
22. A. FRIEDLA-ENDER, THE DILE.MMA OF FREIGHT TASPORT REGULTIO. 27 (1969).
23. One economist has assessed cost-based rates at the ICC as follows:
The application of cost-based rates as defined by an economist would tend to
create an incorrect specification of costs, incorrect adjustments in capacity, and ex-
cessive losses. But cost-based rates as defined by the ICC have definitely created
misspecification of the costs and thus led to inisspecification of the rate floors.
Basically, the problem lies with a rather mechanistic and siplistic attempt to
estimate some subtle cost relationships . . . . Thus until the techniques and skills
used in rail costing improve considerably, tying rates to costs should be avoided.
The probable errors of estimation are so great that the losses involved with the
application of misspecified rates may be greater than the losses associated with
the forms of price discrimination currently practiced.
Id. at 137.
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the revenues earned in the competitive market and the costs of all the
resources used in providing the competitive services. This would re-
move the incentive for the regulated firm with some monopoly markets
to persist indefinitely in serving a competitive market at a price that
did not allow it to recover all of its costs.
While incremental cost analysis could potentially provide useful in-
formation to regulatory agencies, a substantial period of time will be
necessary to refine the techniques and train regulatory personnel to be
alert to the many potential abuses. Until then, the agencies may find
useful the presentation of supplementary long-range incremental cost
data and other attempted justifications of lower rates in competitive
areas, but greater reliance should be placed on fully allocated cost
studies of the regulated firms. Such studies would provide more com-
plete information as to the extent of subsidization of competitive serv.
ices by monopoly services.
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